Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz (1972) , is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are strategic about their demands. This is captured by the Walrasian Mechanism that proceeds by collecting reported demands, finding clearing prices in the reported market via an ascending price tâtonnement procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used, for example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper and gold in London.
INTRODUCTION
The manner in which market prices are set and adjusted is a central area of study in economic theory. A formal approach to this topic was proposed by Walras [1874] , who defined the concept of competitive (aka Walrasian) equilibrium: an assignment of prices to goods such that, when each agent takes his preferred allocation under the given price vector, the market clears (i.e., all goods are sold) and no good is overdemanded. An important property of the Walrasian equilibrium, known as the First Welfare Theorem, states that whenever an equilibrium exists, the allocation is efficient. Following Walras' original work, the existence of such competitive equilibria for various types of economies has been shown [Kelso and Crawford 1982; Gul and Stacchetti 1999] , often accompanied by simple and distributed algorithmic procedures to compute such prices [Cheung et al. 2013; Nisan and Segal 2006; Murota and Tamura 2003] .
The Walrasian equilibrium is suggestive of a process by which prices are adjusted in markets, but it is also often used directly as a mechanism to allocate goods. Double auctions, which are prevalent in finance, essentially work by computing a price that clears the market and executing as many trades as possible at that price. The opening price of the New York Stock Exchange is computed in such a way. The way the prices of copper and gold in London are adjusted follows a similar procedure: the demands of agents are elicited and market-clearing prices are computed. We refer to Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [1994] for a more extensive discussion.
It has been commonly observed that, in response to such mechanisms, traders might strategically reduce their demands for certain goods to seek more favourable prices. As Rustichini et al [1994] write: "Such behavior, which is the essence of bargaining, may lead to an impasse that delays or lessens the gains from trade." This leads to a natural question: to what extent does strategic behavior of economic agents, rather than pricetaking behavior, hurt the efficiency of a market? Hurwicz [1972] proposed a game-theoretical framework to analyze settings where agents are strategic. In such model each economic agent is a player in a noncooperative game and their strategy is a report of their preferences. After reporting their preferences, which serves as a proxy for their demands, the competitive equilibrium in the declared market determines allocation and payments to the agents, who evaluate their outcome with respect to their true preferences. We will call this the Walrasian Game or Walrasian Mechanism. Hurwicz [1972] observes that truthfully reporting preferences is not always an equilibrium of the Walrasian game. An initial characterization of equilibria was done by Hurwicz and then extended by Otani and Sicilian [1982; 1990] , who showed that inefficient outcomes arise as the equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism.
The previously mentioned work focuses on economies with divisible goods. For indivisible goods, Gul and Stacchetti [1999; 2000] show that truthful revelation of demands is not in general an equilibrium for the Walrasian Mechanism, except in the special cases of additive valuations (in which it corresponds to isolated English auctions) and in the unit-demand case (which corresponds to the ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [1986] ). For generic gross substitute valuations, no dynamic ascending price auction can be truthful [Gul and Stacchetti 2000] .
A natural response to such observations is to seek conditions under which the equilibria of the Walrasian game resemble the competitive equilibrium one would obtain from the truthful reports. An intuition first formalized by Roberts and Postlewaite [1976] is that in large markets, the ability of each individual player to influence the market is minimal, so agents should approximately behave as price-taking agents. They capture the concept of large markets through replica economies, i.e., they con-sider the equilibria of a game where there are k identical copies of each agent and each good and study the limit as k goes to infinity. The original result of Roberts and Postlewaite shows that the incentives for the agents not to act as price-takers are vanishingly small in the size of the economy. Jackson and Manelli [1994] show that under some regularity conditions, the equilibrium allocations in large markets will be close to the allocations in the competitive equilibrium. A version of this result for double auctions was later provided by Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [1994] and Satterthwaite and Williams [2002] for a simple market with unit-demand traders. Recently, Azevedo and Budish [2012] proposed the notion of strategyproof in the large that generalizes this idea to other strategic settings such as matching markets.
Our results. In this paper we seek to provide efficiency guarantees for the equilibria of market-clearing mechanisms, such as the Walrasian game, without resorting to large market assumptions. 2 Since it is known that Nash equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism may be inefficient [Otani and Sicilian 1982] , we aim to show that all equilibria are approximately efficient, i.e., the ratio between the welfare of an optimal allocation and the welfare of a Nash equilibrium is bounded. This ratio is referred to as the Price of Anarchy of the game. Our main result is a bound on this ratio. Unlike previous results, our bound is independent of the number of players, the number of items, or any distributional assumptions on the valuations. We follow the model of Hurwicz [1972] where the strategy of each player is a reported valuation over the goods in the markets. We model goods as indivisible and heterogeneous items and assume that players have combinatorial valuations over the goods. Our model of economy follows Gul and Stachetti [1999; 2000] : we assume that each player is initially endowed with a sufficiently large amount of money that neither budgets nor initial endowments influence the equilibrium outcome.
We begin by focusing specifically on the Walrasian mechanism. Recall that this mechanism restricts the agents to report only valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property, which guarantees the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the declared market (Gul and Stachetti [Gul and Stacchetti 1999] ) and thereby ensures that the mechanism is well-defined. Our first result is that if the agents' true valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property, then for any Nash equilibrium in which no agent bids in a way that exposes himself to the possibility of obtaining negative utility ex post 3 , the equilibrium outcome generates welfare that is at least one fourth of the socially efficient outcome. Moreover, there always exists at least one equilibrium satisfying the required property. This result extends to mixed Nash and coarse correlated equilibria, as well as the Bayesian setting (incomplete information). In particular, we show that the expected efficiency of any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism is at least one fourth of the expected optimal welfare. This extension to incomplete information settings is done via the smooth mechanisms framework of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] , which is based on Roughgarden's notion of smooth games [2009; 2012] .
The above results can be extended along multiple dimensions. First, we can relax the requirement that agents do not engage in "risky" bidding behavior, as follows. We parameterize the loss in efficiency by the exposure factor, which is a measure of risk tolerance. We say that a strategy has exposure factor γ if, by playing such strategy, an agent is guaranteed to never pay more than (1 + γ) times his value for the items he receives, under any declarations of the other agents. We show that, for the Walrasian mechanism, the ratio between the socially optimal welfare and the equilibrium welfare will be at most (4 + 2γ) at any equilibrium in which each agent's strategy has exposure factor at most γ.
Additionally, our efficiency guarantees extend to circumstances in which the true preferences of the agents do not satisfy the gross substitutes condition, but instead are drawn from more general classes of valuation functions, such as submodular or fractionally subadditive valuations. That is, even in circumstances where a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist with respect to the true preferences of the agents, a mechanism that restricts the participants to report gross substitutes valuations and then allocates according to a pricing equilibrium of the reported valuations will achieve approximately welfare-maximizing outcomes at equilibrium. Indeed, we show that this result holds even if the declared preferences are restricted even further to the class of additive valuations.
Finally, our efficiency guarantees can be generalized to apply more broadly than the Walrasian mechanism. Indeed, our results apply to any mechanism that chooses an allocation maximizing the welfare of the declared valuations and charges prices no larger then the bids. It is trivial to see that the Walrasian mechanism has these properties. Under this extension, our techniques can be applied to other mechanisms such as the VCG mechanism and the "pay-your-bid" mechanism (which generates the welfare-optimal allocation but charges payments equal to the declared values for goods received). Moreover, for pay-your-bid pricing, our bounds do not require any assumptions about the exposure factor of the agents' strategies, since the pricing rule ensures that agents do not "overbid" on the allocations they receive at equilibrium.
The application to the VCG mechanism is notable, as it relates to a recent line of work on efficiency guarantees in auctions with reduced expressiveness. For example, the VCG mechanism with reports restricted to be additive functions is precisely the "simultaneous single-item auction" studied first by Christodoulou, Kovács and Schapira [2008] , then subsequently in a line of research aimed at analyzing the efficiency of this mechanism under various classes of agent valuations [Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Hassidim et al. 2011; Paes Leme et al. 2012; Syrgkanis 2012; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2012; Feldman et al. 2013 ]. Our main result implies a price of anarchy bound on this auction format, under a wide variety of payment rules, when agents' true valuations are fractionally subadditive. For this specific case of the VCG auction where agents are constrained to use a bidding language more restrictive than the valuation space, price of anarchy bounds were independently obtained by Dütting, Henzinger and Starnberger [2013] .
In the case that agents are able to express their true valuations (i.e., the type space and bidding language are the same), our bounds on the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria hold even if the distribution from which values are drawn exhibit correlations among agents. This is in contrast with item bidding auctions, which have good efficiency if valuations of the agents are drawn from independent distributions, but are known to perform very poorly in settings where the valuations of the players are correlated [Bhawalkar 2013; Feldman et al. 2013 ]. Indeed, it has been recently shown that constant-factor approximation bounds for correlated distributions necessarily requires that bids can be of exponential length [Dobzinski et al. 2014] , so in particular an additive bidding language cannot suffice. Underlying this fact is the phenomenon known as the exposure problem -which refers to a scenario in which agents cannot fully express their valuations without exposing themselves to the risk of negative utility. Consider, for example, the extreme case of an unit-demand player (i.e., a player that wants at most one item) participating in a simultaneous item auction. He must choose between placing bids on multiple items and exposing himself to the risk of winning and paying for more then one item, or instead placing only a single "safe" bid which severely constrains his ability to express his preferences. Our results suggest that the ability to express one's true valuation is crucial for attaining approximate efficiency at equilibrium in settings where valuations are drawn from correlated distributions.
Other related work. Other recent papers have studied Nash equilibria of games induced by market mechanisms. Adsul et al [2010] study the Nash equilibria of the game induced by the Linear Fisher Market, showing existence of equilibrium and providing a complete polyhedral characterization in some special cases. Chen, Deng, Zhang [2011] and Chen, Deng, Zhang, Zhang [2012] study incentive ratios in Fisher Markets, i.e., they bound how much the utility of any given player can improve by strategic play in comparison to his utility if he were to play truthfully. Markakis and Telelis [2012] and de Keijzer et al [2013] study the Price of Anarchy of Uniform Price Auctions, which can be cast as a game derived from a market equilibrium computation.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Throughout the paper we will denote vectors by bold letters: p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) ∈ R m will denote a vector of prices over m items. Given a subset S ⊆ [m], we will denote by 1 S the indicator vector of set S. When S = [m], we will omit the subscript, i.e., 1 = 1 [m] is the vector where all components are 1. Similarly 0 = 1 ∅ is the vector of all zeros. Given two vectors x, y we will denote by z = x ∪ y and w = x ∩ y by the vectors such that z i = max{x i , y i } and w i = min{x i , y i } respectively. Also, for binary vectors x ∈ {0, 1} m we say j ∈ x if x j = 1. We will also denote dot products as follows:
Classes of valuation functions. A class of valuation functions is a subset of
In what follows, we will consider various subsets of increasing level of complexity.
It is known that (ADD∪UD) GS SM XOS. We refer to Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [Lehmann et al. 2006 ] for a more extensive discussion on the relation between such classes. One important property of those classes is the closure with respect to the OR (∨) operator. Given a set of valuations
In other words, the value of the OR of multiple agents' valuation functions evaluated at x is the value of the optimal partition of the goods in x among the agents. Notice that the function is defined over the domain of x ∈ Z m + so to allow the optimal partition that allocated item j at most x j times. We say that a valuation class is closed under the OR operator when, given any valuations v 1 , . . . , v n in the class, the valuation ∨ i v i restricted to {0, 1} m is also in the class.
It is known from [Lehmann et al. 2006; Murota 1996 ] that the classes ADD, GS and XOS are closed under the OR operator.
Market economy. Consider a market with n agents and m goods, each agent with a valuation v i : {0, 1} m → R + over the set of goods and quasi-linear utilities, i.e., the utility of agent i to be allocated a bundle
and a partition of the goods into disjoint bundles 1 = i x i such that for each player i, x i ∈ D vi (p). The First Welfare Theorem states that whenever a Walrasian equilibrium exists, it maximizes welfare, i.e., the partition maximizes i v i (x i ). We call a vector p ∈ R m + Walrasian prices if there is an allocation that paired with such vector forms a Walrasian equilibrium. The Second Welfare Theorem states that given any partition of the items y i maximizing i v i (y i ) and any vector of Walrasian prices p, the pair composed of this vector and those allocations is a Walrasian equilibrium.
A classical result due to Kelso and Crawford [Kelso and Crawford 1982] guarantees the existence of Walrasian equilibria if the valuation functions are gross substitutes. Gul and Stachetti [Gul and Stacchetti 1999] show that this condition is in some sense necessary: gross substitutes is the largest class of valuation functions containing unitdemand valuations for which a Walrasian equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist.
Gul and Stachetti [Gul and Stacchetti 1999] also show that the set of Walrasian prices forms a lattice, i.e., for any valuations v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ GS, if p and p ′ are Walrasian prices for such valuations, then p ∩ p ′ and p ∪ p ′ are also Walrasian prices. This implies in particular that there exist Walrasian price vectors p and p such that for all Walrasian prices p, it is the case that p ≤ p ≤ p. The existence proof in Kelso and Crawford [Kelso and Crawford 1982] is constructive and yields a simple and natural ascending price procedure called Walrasian tâtonnement that computes a Walrasian equilibrium. Later in [Gul and Stacchetti 2000] , Gul and Stachetti argue that this procedure produces the equilibrium corresponding to the lowest point in the lattice, i.e., with prices p.
Both price vectors p and p have a clean description in terms of the welfare function. Gul and Stachetti [Gul and Stacchetti 1999] show that p and p can be calculated by the following closed-form formulas:
In other words, the price p j is the extra benefit for society for an additional copy of item j. The price p j is how much harm to the welfare of the society removing item j will cause.
Auction games. We want to consider the market economy as a strategic game, following the model proposed by Hurwicz [Hurwicz 1972 ]. Before we do that, we define a generic auction game and propose how to study its equilibria. The setting is composed of m items and n agents with valuations v i in a certain valuation space V. A game for such a setting consists of a bidding space B and allocation and payment functions:
The allocation is supposed to be such that i
For this paper, we will be interested in games such that the bidding language is a subset of the valuation space, i.e., B ⊆ V. The utilities in such game are given by
As an example, consider the case of the second price (i.e., Vickrey) auction for a single item. This is an auction game in which m = 1, and where V = B = R + . The allocation rule is given by x i = 1 if i has the highest bid (breaking ties lexicographically) and zero otherwise. The payment rule is given by π i = max j =i b j whenever x i = 1, and zero otherwise.
We will study auction games in two different settings, non-Bayesian and Bayesian. We also refer to the non-Bayesian setting as the full information setting.
Nash equilibria and Price of Anarchy. We are interested in studying the Nash equilibria of such games, i.e., for v ∈ V n :
In particular we are interested in measuring the social welfare in equilibrium
) against the optimal welfare across all partitions of the items. The maximum and minimum of such ratio are known as the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS):
both the price of anarchy and the price of stability are defined to be 1.
Bayesian Equilibria and Bayesian Price of Anarchy. If the valuation space in endowed with a distribution D over V n (which need not be independent between agents), one can study auction games as Bayesian games. For such games the strategy of each player is a mapping b i : V → B and the set of Bayes Nash equilibria are given by:
, ∀b ′ i ∈ B} and the corresponding notions of Bayesian Price of Anarchy and Bayesian Price of Stability are given by:
.
Exposure factor. Even for the single-item second price auction in the full information setting (and more generally for the VCG mechanism), it is not possible to give any reasonable bound for PoA due to so-called bullying equilibria. Consider a setting with a single items and two agents with values v 1 = 1 and v 2 = ǫ for this item. The bids b 1 = 0 and b 2 = 10 form a Nash equilibrium with welfare ǫ while the optimal welfare is 1. Although this is an equilibrium, it is based on an aggressive bid by agent 2 which exposes him to loss; agent 2 can end up with negative utility if agent 1 were to change his bid to 1. In order to get around the issue of bullying that is based on large exposure, we define what we call the exposure factor, which quantifies the amount of risk an agent with type v i is exposing himself to by bidding b i . We say that the strategy b i has exposure factor γ if
We will call a strategy with γ = 0 a non-exposure strategy, since for any bids of the other agents, agent i is guaranteed to have non-negative utility. We will be interested in bounding the Price of Anarchy across equilibria with γ exposure, i.e.:
NASH γ (v) = {b ∈ NASH(v); b i has γ exposure factor for all i}.
We define POA γ , POS γ by simply substituting NASH by NASH γ in the definition.
To define exposure in the Bayesian setting, we consider payments and values in expectation over the players' types, but in the worst case over bidding strategies. We say that bidding strategy b i has exposure factor γ if, for every profile of other players'
That is, regardless of the strategies selected by other players, the expected payment of agent i is no more than (1 + γ) times his expected value for the outcome. We can then define BNASH γ as b ∈ BNASH(D) such that b has exposure factor γ. We also define BPOA γ and BPOS γ by substituting BNASH γ for BNASH. As before, each of the above measures of the price of anarchy and the price of stability are taken to be 1 whenever the corresponding set of equilibria is empty.
It is worth noting that for the case of single item second price auction, a common way to get around bullying equilibria is to note that it is a weakly dominated strategy for an agent to bid above his valuation. This, however, is not necessarily true for other auction formats (like item bidding) where agents bid on multiple items. Correspondingly, much of the prior literature on auction games for multiple items [Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Christodoulou et al. 2008; Feldman et al. 2013; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] has imposed some form of a "bounded overbidding" assumption on players' strategies at equilibrium.
Walrasian mechanism. We define a Walrasian mechanism as a game where we ask each agent to report a valuation function b i ∈ B and compute a Walrasian equilibrium of the reported market. In other words, x i : B n → {0, 1} m and π i : B n → R + is a Walrasian mechanism if there is a price function p :
It is known that, in general, Walrasian equilibria might not exist. However, if B ⊆ GS, then a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Moreover, because Walrasian prices form a lattice, we will be interested in two distinct flavors of the Walrasian mechanism for gross substitutes:
-English Walrasian Mechanism: This is the mechanism that implements the lower point of the lattice of Walrasian prices. Formally, it allocates according to the optimal allocation with respect to declared values b and charges π i (b) = j∈xi W b (1 j |1). This mechanism is also called English Auctions with Differentiated Commodities by Gul and Stacchetti [Gul and Stacchetti 2000] . For the special case of one item, it corresponds to the second price / English auction.
-Dutch Walrasian Mechanism: This is the mechanism that implements the higher point of the lattice of Walrasian prices. Formally, it allocates according to the optimal allocation with respect to declared values b and charges π
For the special case of one item, it corresponds to the first price / Dutch auction.
Beyond Gross substitute valuations, Walrasian equilibria are not guaranteed to exist. Even so, the English and Dutch Walrasian mechanisms are still well-defined as described above, using the optimal allocation rule and payments from Equation (1).
Also, for the special case where B = ADD, these mechanisms are equivalent to the second-and first-price item bidding auctions, respectively, as studied in [Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Christodoulou et al. 2008; Feldman et al. 2013; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] .
We note that, like the simultaneous item bidding auctions described above, strategies that includes overbidding (i.e., declaring more than one's true value for certain sets of goods) are not necessarily weakly dominated in the Walrasian mechanism. An example is given in the full version of the paper.
Declared Welfare Maximizers. A general class of auction games that includes the Walrasian mechanism is the class of declared welfare maximizers. We say that a mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer if x 1 (b), . . . , x n (b) is a partition of the set of items maximizing i b i (x i ). In order for the b i to have the semantics of maximum willingness to pay for a bundle, we enforce the following two properties over the payment function: (i) π i (b) ≤ b i (x i (b)), i.e., no agent pays more then his declared value for the bundle he receives, and (ii) for any
i.e., for any bid on a subset, there is a set of bids of the other players such that player i will pay his bid on his allocated subset.
It is simple to see that the Walrasian mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer. We also consider the following other declared welfare maximizers:
-VCG Mechanism: The mechanism allocates according to the optimal declared allocation and charges agents according to the externality they impose on the other players. Formally, we have:
The mechanism allocates according to the optimal declared allocation and charges the bids, i.e., π i = b i (x i ).
The following observation about declared welfare maximizers follows immediately from the definitions: OBSERVATION 2.1 (BOUNDED OVERBIDDING). Consider a declared welfare maximizer mechanism and agents with valuations v 1 , . . . , v n . If b i is a strategy with exposure factor γ,
EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT EQUILIBRIA
In this section we first argue that in the non-Bayesian setting, for any valuation profile that admits a Walrasian equilibrium, both the English and Dutch versions of the Walrasian mechanism have Nash equilibria that are efficient and only use non-exposure strategies, implying that the Price of Stability is 1. For instance, this is always true when agents have Gross substitutes valuations. After that we show that they also often have inefficient equilibria as well. This is also true for the VCG mechanism.
LEMMA 3.1. If v is a valuation profile for which a Walrasian equilibrium exists, the English Walrasian mechanism has pure and efficient Nash equilibria that employ only non-exposure strategies.
PROOF. Let p ∈ R m + be a vector of Walrasian prices for the market economy defined by v and let (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) be the corresponding optimal allocation. Such prices exist since the valuations are gross substitute. We first prove the claim assuming that p j > 0 for all j ∈ [m]. Consider the following bids b i (y) = p · (x * i ∩ y). In other words, each agent submits an additive bid in which he bids on each item he wins in the optimal allocation exactly its Walrasian price. Clearly the mechanism allocates x * i to player i, which is an efficient allocation. Now, we need to show that this strategy is non-exposure and that this is a Nash equilibrium.
Non-exposure:
Since the payment of the Walrasian mechanism for a bundle is at most the bid on this bundle, it is enough to show that b i (y) ≤ v i (y) on any y ∈ {0, 1} m . Fix any y ∈ {0, 1} m and let z = x * i ∩ y. Now, b i (y) = p · z by the definition of b i . Also since x * i is the set maximizing player i's utility under prices p we know that:
Under bids b the payment of the English Walrasian mechanism are zero, since no two players bid on the same item. Therefore
. By the definition of prices in the English Walrasian auction, the price of each item in y but not in
The assumption that p j > 0 made in the proof can be easily removed by slightly changing bids b i to bid an infinitesimally small amount ǫ on each item in x * i that has price zero and for which i has positive marginal value. The same arguments can be made about the Dutch Walrasian auction, yet one needs to be careful how to deal with tie breaking rules. The adaptation from the previous proof from the English to the Dutch Walrasian mechanism follows exactly the same arguments in Hassidim et al [Hassidim et al. 2011] for proving the existence of efficient equilibria in first-price item bidding auctions with gross substitute valuations. Now, we show two examples of inefficient equilibria of the Walrasian mechanism. The first example highlights the incentives to perform demand reduction, i.e., to underreport one's value. This is in line with the observation of Rustichini et al [Rustichini et al. 1994 ] that demand reduction is a common practice in bargaining.
Example 3.3 (Incentives to reduce demand). Consider a market with two agents and two items. The first agent is unit demand with value 1 + ǫ per item and the second agent is additive with value 2 per item. Formally v 1 (x) = (1 + ǫ) max{x 1 , x 2 } and v 2 (x) = 2(x 1 + x 2 ).
If agents report truthfully in the English Walrasian mechanism, items are both priced at 1 + ǫ and agent 2 acquires both, getting utility 2 − 2ǫ. Agent 2, however, can improve his utility by changing his bid to b ′ 2 (x) = 2x 1 , without exposing himself. Now, he only acquires the first item, but Walrasian prices are zero, giving him utility u ′ 2 = 2 > u 2 . This produces a Nash equilibrium of welfare 3, while the optimal allocation has welfare 4, showing that POA 0 ≥ 4/3 for English Walrasian Mechanism.
Our next example highlights inefficiency due to a failure of the agents to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium.
Example 3.4 (Inefficiency due to Miscoordination). Consider two items A, B and two unit demand agents 1, 2 with valuations v 1 (x) = max{(2 − ǫ)x A , x B } and v 2 (x) = max{x A , (2−ǫ)x B }. Consider now the following equilibrium in which both agents miscoordinate and bid a high amount on their least favorite item and zero on their preferred item: b 1 (x) = x B and b 2 (x) = x A . Both items get priced at zero under such declarations, agent 1 is allocated item B and agent 2 is allocated item A. This is a Nash equilibrium since the utility of each agent is 1 and by deviating his value can increase by at most 1 − ǫ but if this happens, his payment will increase by at least 1. The welfare in equilibrium is 2, while the optimal allocation has welfare 4 − 2ǫ. This shows that POA 0 ≥ 2.
For γ > 0, consider agents with valuations v 1 (x) = max{(2 − ǫ)x A , 2 2+γ x B } and v 2 (x) = max{ 2 2+γ x A , (2 − ǫ)x B }. The bids b 1 (x) = 2(1+γ) 2+γ x B and b 2 (x) = 2(1+γ) 2+γ x A form an inefficient equilibrium with exposure factor γ and welfare 4 2+γ while the optimal welfare is 4 − 2ǫ. This implies that POA γ ≥ 2 + γ.
It is interesting to notice that in the previous example all valuations are unitdemand. In such case, the outcome of the English Walrasian mechanism coincides with the VCG mechanism [Gul and Stacchetti 2000] , in which truthtelling is a dominant strategy. The example show that the truth being dominant, there are other equilibria as well that generate inefficient outcomes. We will see that for the case of the VCG auction, the bound above is essentially tight.
BOUNDING THE INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA
Given Examples 3.3 and 3.4, it is natural to ask how large the gap between the welfare of the optimal allocation and the worse welfare of a Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism can be made. Our main result is an upper bound on such ratio that holds for any declared welfare maximizer, in particular, any flavor of the Walrasian mechanism, the VCG mechanism, or the first price mechanism. This bound depends only on the exposure factor and holds even in the Bayesian setting (and even with correlated distributions) and doesn't depend on number of players, number of items or any characteristic of the distribution. Notice in particular that the following theorems do not require large market assumptions.
We begin by presenting the statement of our results, starting with its version for gross substitute valuations and then discussing extensions to the more general class of XOS valuation. We then describe a specialization of this result for the VCG mechanism. Proofs are left for the following subsections. THEOREM 4.1. If V = B = GS and the mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer, i.e., allocates according to the optimal partition of items with respect to the bids, then POA γ ≤ 4 + 2γ.
The following theorem is a strict generalization of the previous for Bayesian settings. Theorem 4.1 can be recovered as a special case of its Bayesian counterpart Theorem 4.2 by taking the distribution concentrated on a single valuation profile. The following proof follows from smoothness arguments [Roughgarden 2009 [Roughgarden , 2012 Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; Lucier and Paes Leme 2011] and therefore generalizes also to other equilibrium concepts such as mixed Nash, coarse correlated equilibria and outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics. THEOREM 4.2. If V = B = GS, the mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer and V is endowed with a (possibly correlated) probability distribution D, then BPOA γ ≤ 4 + 2γ.
Next, we extend Theorem 4.2 to allow the larger class of XOS valuations (that contains, in particular, all submodular valuations). This extension comes at the cost of a slightly weaker bound on the price of anarchy. THEOREM 4.3. If V = B = XOS and the mechanism is a declared welfare maximizer then BPOA γ ≤ 6 + 4γ.
For the special case of the VCG mechanism, we further improve the bound, matching the lower bound in Example 3.4: THEOREM 4.4. If V = B = GS, then for the VCG mechanism, BPOA γ ≤ 2 + γ. If V = B = XOS, then for the VCG mechanism, BPOA γ ≤ 3 + 2γ.
We can also improve our bounds for the Pay-Your-Bid mechanism, via different techniques. These bounds are independent of γ, as discussed in Section 4.4. THEOREM 4.5. Fix any γ ≥ 0. If V = B = GS, then for the Pay-Your-Bid mechanism, BPOA γ ≤ 2. If V = B = XOS, then for the Pay-Your-Bid mechanism, BPOA γ ≤ 3.
As in Theorem 4.2, the above results follow from smoothness arguments, and therefore generalize to mixed Nash equilibria, coarse correlated equilibria, and outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics. Moreover, since pure Nash equilibria are a special case of Bayes-Nash equilibria, the bounds on BPOA γ also apply to POA γ .
In the previous results, we assumed that all valuations v ∈ V could be represented in the bidding language B. It is often useful to restrict the bidding language for various reasons:
-representation and communication: very expressive combinatorial valuations like XOS require many bits to be expressed. It might be desirable to restrict to a simpler class, as additive, unit demand or a simple combination of those, for which the valuation can be more simply represented and communicated. -computational efficiency: there are computationally efficient algorithms to find the optimal allocation when bids are gross substitutes [Fujishige and Tamura 2007] but it is computationally hard to compute the optimal allocation for general submodular and XOS valuations -simplicity: a simpler bidding language might lead to simpler and more intuitive design to agents. A prime example of such approach are item bidding auctions.
We show that the results for Nash equilibria presented above still hold for mechanisms with restricted bidding languages, as long as agents are able to express additive valuations. These bounds apply to Bayes-Nash equilibria as well, but we require that agent types be independent; that is, the distribution D is such that for i = j, v i and v j are independent random variables. For the special case of the VCG mechanism, we can strengthen the bounds:
The bounds also hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria as long as the distribution from which valuations are sampled is independent across agents.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proofs of Theorems 4.1 through 4.6.
Declared Efficiency Maximizers for gross substitute bidders
The following lemma that will be useful in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Recall the notation
LEMMA 4.7. If b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ GS, then for any partition x i of the items, i.e. i
PROOF.
A key observation is that the GS is closed under the OR operator, so W b and W b−i are gross substitutes and therefore submodular. Using this fact, we first show
In order to see that, let y i be player i allocation in an optimal partition of 1 −
is the allocation of i in an optimal allocation with respect to the true valuations, and the second inequality is Lemma 4.7. Taking expectations, we obtain:
Since b is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we know that
Using the previous line as well as Observation 2.1, we get
Declared Efficiency Maximizers for XOS bidders
We note that the only point in the proof of Theorem 4.1 where we used that valuations are gross substituted was inside Lemma 4.7 to argue that W b is a submodular function. Even when b i are submodular for all i, W b might fail to be submodular [Lehmann et al. 2006 ]. To go around this problem, we prove a version of Lemma 4.7 for the broader class of XOS valuations.
LEMMA 4.8. If b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ XOS, then for any partition
PROOF. Letx 1 , . . . ,x n be a partition maximizing the declared welfare, i.e.,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that W b−i (1 − x i ) is the value of the optimal allocation of 1 − x i to agents k = i and k =i b k (x k ∩ (1 − x i )) is the value of a particular allocation. Now, we can bound the value of b k (x k ∩ (1 − x i )) using the w k vectors:
since for each k there are n − 1 terms of type w k · (x k ∩ (1 − x i )) and each term in w k ·x k appears in all but one of them, since each term corresponds to an item j ∈x k and appears in all terms except the one for which j ∈ x i . Therefore, we have 
Completing the proof as in Theorem 4.2, carrying through the extra factor of 2 in the sum of bids, yields
Efficiency of Equilibria for the VCG mechanism
We next show how to improve our bounds on the efficiency of equilibria, for the particular case of the VCG mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 : Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a valuation profile and b a Nash equilibrium of the VCG mechanism. Let also x * 1 , . . . , x * n be an optimal allocation with respect to the true valuations. We consider a deviation where player i bids his true value instead:
. Summing for all agents i and applying Lemma 4.8 in case of XOS valuations and Lemma 4.7 in case of GS valuations, we get the desired bound. The extension to the Bayesian case follows the exact same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Efficiency of Equilibria for the Pay-Your-Bid mechanism
We note that for the special case of the pay-your-bid mechanism, the equilibrium behavior of the agents will be independent of the exposure that agents are willing to tolerate. For any γ ≥ 0, at equilibrium, no agent would bid more than his true value for the set that he wins, as this would generate negative utility. Thus, we can improve the results of Theorems 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.6 for the special case of the pay-your-bid mechanism, and for each of the bounds and any γ ≥ 0, improve it to the bound that is achieved for γ = 0. In addition to removing the dependence on γ, we improve the bounds in Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 by an additional factor of 2, as follows 5 :
Proof of Theorem 4.5 : The last step in the proof of Theorem 4.1 uses that u
In the Pay-Your-Bid auction, however,
Using this observation in the last step of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, in place of the original two inequalities, yields the desired results.
Restricted Bidding Languages
Finally, we now analyze equilibria of welfare-maximizing mechanisms when the bidding language is not necessarily identical to the agents' type space, but is rather assumed only to be a subset of the type space that includes the set of additive valuation functions.
Proof of Theorem 4.6 :
The proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.1 required that a player with valuation v i ∈ V was able to bid b i = 1 2 v i ∈ B . Looking closer, one realizes that in fact, there only needs to exist a bid b ′ i ∈ B with the following property:
where (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) is an optimal allocation with respect to bids. A simple observation is that if v i ∈ XOS, then there is such bid b ′ i ∈ ADD. Notice that v i (x) = max j∈I w j · x, so for some j ∈ I, v i (x * i ) = w j · x * i , so simply take b ′ i (x) = 1 2 w j · x i . For VCG instead of declared welfare maximizers, one can use the same argument without the half factor, i.e., one needs a deviating bid such that b ′ i (x i ) ≤ v i (x i ) for all x i ∈ {0, 1} m and b ′ i (x * i ) = v i (x * i ). One can simply take b ′ i (x) = w j · x i . The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 to extend Theorem 4.1 to the Bayesian case rely on the deviation b ′ i = 1 2 v i depending only on the type of i. In the above proof, however, the deviation b ′ i (x i ) = w i · x i depends not only on v i but also on x * i , which is a function of the entire valuation profile v. Using the technique recently introduced by Syrgkanis and Tardos [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] , however, one can obtain Price of Anarchy bounds in the Bayesian setting from "smoothness-type" proofs for the case where the distribution over valuations is independent across agents.
CONCLUSION
We investigate the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism when agents strategically report their demands. It is known from Jackson and Manelli [1994] , Roberts and Postelwaite [1976] and recently Azevedo and Budish [2012] that in the limit as the market grows large, the players have little incentive to misreport their true demand and therefore the equilibrium approaches the market outcome with respect to the true preferences. In this paper, we analyze the small market regime, which models situations where the market is very specialized with few players or the market has a few major players whose transactions considerably affect the prices. Such situations are not uncommon in niches of the financial market, for example.
Without any assumptions on size of the market or on the distributions under which valuations are drawn, we show a bound on the efficiency of the market, measured in terms of the ratio between the optimal welfare and the welfare of the worst Nash equilibria. We show, however, that the efficiency crucially depends on a parameter that measures the amount of "risk" players are willing to expose themselves. We call this parameter the exposure factor.
Our results are extended to the broader class of declared welfare maximizer mechanisms, which are mechanisms that elicit bids from the agents in the form of valuations over the items, allocates according to the optimal allocation in the declared market, and charges prices that are at most the bids. Besides the Walrasian mechanism, this includes also the VGC mechanism and the pay-your-bid mechanism.
For some mechanisms, such as VCG, it is dominated to employ strategies with exposure factor γ > 0, when the bidding language B is rich enough to represent all valuations v ∈ V. So, under elimination of weakly dominated strategies, our bounds hold with γ = 0 for such mechanisms. We also showed that the same is not true for the Walrasian mechanism. We leave as an open question if there is some γ > 0 for which strategies with exposure factor γ are dominated, for example when the space of bids and the space of true valuations are both GS.
Certain classes of valuations such as submodular or XOS are so rich that they don't allow for computationally efficient methods to reach the optimal allocation. We discuss one option to get around this problem in the paper: restrict the class of valuations that agents can submit as bids. We show that our results still holds if the restricted bidding language contains at least the class of additive valuations. An alternative solution would be to compute an approximately optimal allocation, say using the procedures of Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [2006] or Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi [2012] . We believe an interesting open problem arising from this work is how to extend our results to approximate declared welfare maximizers.
